Posts Tagged ‘iran’

Written in the stars

June 27, 2009

Tweets via The Dish:

Tonight, the roar Allah Akbar and all the cities of Tehran was long

But a sobering first-hand account in this week’s Die Zeit by Navid Kermani. Here’s a fast and loose translation of the last paragraph:

On the plane back I’m amazed about the euphoric tone of the commentary  in the international papers, which extoll the demonstrators. It may be meant well, but ignores the fact that the opposition doesn’t stand a chance in the face of this overmighty and violent security apparatus. At this point the Revolutionary Guard has not even been let loose. Even if – but how? – the protests somehow are continued and hundreds of thousands or millions take to the streets again just as before the Supreme Leader’s Friday Prayer, then there could be a backstage revolt in Tehran or Qom. If not, it won’t be the jurists calling the shots from hereon, but batons, water canons and rifles.

On MSN Messenger yesterday my father was similarly amazed at some of the commentary I quoted (he also chortled at the fact that The Guardian had ditched its Iran Live Blog for a Michael Jackson Live Blog – it’s all about clicking those ads nowadays, isn’t it?).

Meanwhile, here’s Kermani’s colleague Ulricht Ladurner in the same edition of Die Zeit:

At the moment the regime might have brought the streets back under its control, but there have been surprises, not least the fact that Mir Husein Mussavi, the defeated presidential candidate who sees himself as the legitimate winner of the election, is ignoring the commands of the Supreme Leader. Khamenei demanded an end to the demonstrations, but Mussavi called on the people to continue taking to the streets and demand justice. This “refusal to obey orders” [sic] is remarkable. Mussavi is a child of the revolution and a friend of the system he finds himself now in opposition to. This is a new development – and could be the beginning of significant change.

Or the fact that as of now the revolution is going to devour its own children. I think we’re back to reading tea leaves.

Bits and pieces…

June 26, 2009

….that might or might not be loosely connected. Like a butterfly flapping its wing far-away in a rainforest, take it away Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri:

“If Iranians cannot talk about their legitimate rights at peaceful gatherings and are instead suppressed, complexities will build up which could possibly uproot the foundations of the government, no matter how powerful.”

Keeping in mind his age and position within the establishment.

But:

Unlike their wide-eyed parents with their utopias and romanticization of revolutionary violence, the new young revolutionaries are sophisticated and canny. They have few illusions about the magnitude of the problems facing their country or the complexities of living in a highly traditional and religious society. For example, despite the fact that they are overwhelmingly secular, their slogans mingle political and religious themes to avoid alienating the faithful. Their response to Obama’s initially measured rhetoric is another sign of a new political sophistication at work: everyone understands that US meddling would be the proverbial kiss of death to the opposition’s cause.

In the days and weeks to come, this infant movement will face difficult challenges. It may suffer some setbacks and reversals, but what matters is the experience it has gained. At this stage, it is doubtful that fear alone can contain the rising tide of discontent or return things to the status quo ante.

When we first skyped after the demonstrations started, my father, who is currently in Tehran, stressed that Iran, for all the depiction in Western media is not a totalitarian but an authoritarian state. As of now that might prove to be a moot point. The apparently monolithic regime has been shown to be split to its core over the last few weeks. Yet as the crackdown on the streets seems to have been resolved the crackdown in the establishment itself might gather pace. Perhaps the question at this point is no longer who will be sidelined (former presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani – who might have actually stayed quiet for exactly these reasons, not to hand any excuse to his opponents to take him down -, never mind presidential candidates Mousevi and Karoubi as the perceived trouble-makers behind the uprising) but the manner in which this will happen. Not that this – I imagine – will be easy: all are stalwarts of the regime and will have their own – however currently silenced – powerbases and loyalties within the regime. If disposed of – whether this be a house arrest or worse – only the illegitimate shell of the regime will remain. But, as Khamanei has demonstrated to be acutely aware of as commander of the military apparatus, might is right. For now.

This might seem a very pessimistic reading, but hey, I am safely ensconsed here in Germany and from this distance, really, what do I know? Not a lot, but allow me to think aloud here. Even if the shell of a regime survives for now – in the sense of what doesn’t kill you only makes you stronger – it must be kept in mind that Iran is not North Korea, which, bizarrely, is the comparison sometimes made. Even if this return to the purist ideals of the Islamic Revolution is exactly what Khamenei is aiming for I suspect this will be impossible. This excellent blog which is written from a position much more knowledgable persuasively argues – with plenty of caveats, because, really, no one in their right minds can claim to make any sure predictions on Iran – that a compromise between the pragmatists of Rafsanjani and the ultraconservatives under Khamenei is the most likely outcome.

One of the caveats here is that Rafsanjani has been progressively sidelined for a while, however, and I think this is banking too much on one person who to all accounts and purposes is no Ghandi or Mandela and therefore is not in a position to wield moral influence beyond Machiavellian power games.  Khodorkovsky’s plight might be a timely reminder that wealth – even of a kind that Rafsanjani is purported to have amassed – is no protection against power hellbent on preservation and expansion. On the contrary, Rafsanjani’s personal stakes might be far too high for him to wish to risk to take too many risks – hence the allegations of corruption by Ahmadenijad and hence the arrest of his daughter and subsequent refusal to let his family leave the country.

Even if, for now, visible protests have been diminished by the brutal clampdown and as news now comes in that hardliners are calling for death sentences against the leaders of the protests the future lies not in the hands of individual players, but in the hands of a people that at one point numbered a cool 2m on the streets. A regime may remove dissent from its own ranks, but it cannot remove the people it claims to govern. And this people will remain dissatisfied as long as injustice reigns at the top, the economy remains in the dumps, opportunities for women to lead a fulfilling life remain extremely restricted and the ideal of Shia Islam remains in the grubby hands of politics. To quote from Ryszard Kapuscinski’s Shah of Shahs once more:

I once saw a spontaneous march come about. A man was walking down the street leading to the airport: he was singing. It was a song about Allah-Allah Akbar! He had a fine, carrying voice of splendid moving tone. He was paying attention to nothing and nobody as he walked. I followed him because I wanted to hear him singing. In a moment a handful of children playing in the street joined him and began to sing. Then there was a group of men and, emerging bashfully from the sides, some women. When there were about a hundred marchers, the crowd began to multiply quickly, at a geometric rate, in fact. A crowd draws a crowd, as Canetti remarked. Here they like to be a crowd, a crowd strengthens them and adds to their importance. They express themselves through the crowd, they seek the crowd, and in a crowd they obviously get rid of something they carry inside themselves when they are alone, something that makes them feel bad.

Whatever happens next at the top and whatever the bluster of hardliners, they will have to tread carefully. The crowd is unpredictable.

Two loose threads

June 23, 2009

Two articles on Iran stick out this evening. The Economist has a decent wrap-up of the situation so far:

Iran faces a long, hot summer. Though it is tempting to suppose that the situation will be resolved, one way or the other, over the next few weeks, the crisis facing the Islamic republic may continue for far longer. Gary Sick, the White House’s main expert on Iran during the revolution and now at Columbia University, writes that “this is not a sprint; it is a marathon. Endurance is at least as important as speed.”

And to quote from Shah of Shahs by Ryszard Kapuscinski, his meditation on the Islamic Revolution which he wrote while being virtually locked up in a deserted international hotel in Tehran at the time:

Every revolution is preceded by a state of general exhaustion and takes place against a background of unleashed aggressiveness. Authority cannot put up with a nation that gets on its nerves; the nation cannot tolerate an authority it has come to hate. Authority has squandered all its credibility and has empty hands, the nation has lost the final scrap of patience and makes a fist. A climate of tension and increasing oppressiveness prevails. We start to feel into a psychosis of terror. The discharge is coming. We feel it.

The ramifications of the past weeks may be more subtle and it’s difficult to account for all the elements at play from this distance. Although Kapuscinski’s observation is almost too general, the parallels with the current crisis are striking. He goes on to argue that even if an oppressive regime is allowed to get away – literally – with murder for a long time it can subsequently come down to the tiniest provocation that really rouses a people into rebellion. If the election charade was the start and the subsequent demonstrations only the first showing, who knows what still lies in store? It might be just one of those unknown unknowns Rumsfeld so infamously spoke of that proves to be the final push.

Meanwhile, I also found this interesting analysis by Hamid Dabashi of the demographics of the demonstrators:

The overwhelming majority of the people pouring into streets of Tehran and other major cities in support of Moussavi are precisely these 15- to 29-year-olds. How could this then be a middle-class uprising if the overwhelming majority of those who are supporting it and putting their lives on the line are in fact jobless 15- to 29-year-olds who still live with their parents — who cannot even afford to rent an apartment, let alone marry and raise a family and join the middle class in a principally oil-based economy that is not labor-intensive to begin with?

Another crucial statistic that Salehi-Isfahani does not cite is the fact that more than 63 percent of university entrants in Iran are women, but only 12 percent are part of the labor force. That means that the remaining 51 percent are out of a job, and yet the most visible aspect of these anti-Ahmadinejad demonstrations is that women visibly outnumber men. How could jobless men and women be participating in a massive middle-class uprising against their “uncouth” leaders?

If we were to look closely at Moussavi’s campaign commercials, his social and economic platforms since he entered the race, and the presidential debates with all the other candidates, we see that a sizable component of his supporters are indeed university students, young faculty and the urban intellectual elite –such as filmmakers, artists and the literati.

But the fact is that a major constituency of Moussavi is also the urban poor and particularly the war veterans who have no respect for Ahmadinejad, believing he had an inglorious war record, but are full of unsurpassed admiration for Moussavi because of his role as a fiercely dedicated prime minister during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988).

I think this is important as there have been a number of articles of late suggesting that the demonstrations are largely made up of the usual suspects, namely students and intellectuals. The striking difference with previous protests is that this time round they have caught on beyond this limited scope of participants.

Addendum: Roger Cohen’s Op-ed is also pretty spot-on:

[...] the hypocritical but effective contract that bound society has been broken. The regime never had active support from more than 20 percent of the population. But acquiescence was secured by using only highly targeted repression (leaving the majority free to go about its business), and by giving people a vote for the president every four years.That’s over. Repression will be broad and ferocious in the coming months. The acquiescent have already become the angry. You can’t turn Iran into Burma: The resistance of a society this varied and savvy will be fierce.

Do read the rest.

Currently following

June 23, 2009

The Guardian live blog on the Iranian crisis and The Daily Dish for its aggregation of links and twitter feeds. Reading twitter gives me a headache as I try to puzzle together the context, but it as everybody says it has played a pivotal role in the protests. It beats the usual I have watered my plants or I’m on holiday at any rate. The German-language edition of Der Spiegel is also relatively up-to-date and comprehensive in its commentary. Still, I’m wondering if there are any other good sites for the developments in Iran?